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LAW, LIBERALISM AND FREE SPEECH. By D.F.B. Tucker. Totowa, 
New Jersey: Rowman & Allanheld. 1985. Pp. ix, 212. Cloth $32.50; 
paper $13.50. 
D.F.B. Tucker's1 Law, Liberalism and Free Speech articulates a 
Rawlsian alternative to "functionalist" justifications of the right to 
free speech. Tucker's goal is to suggest better theoretical underpin-
nings for established legal doctrines; he does not urge major substan-
tive changes in free speech law.2 Building on the works of Ronald 
Dworkin and Thomas Scanlon, he endeavors to construct a deontolog-
ical3 framework for analyzing free speech issues that avoids both the 
inflexibility of "absolutist" deontological theories and the "indetermi-
nacy" of functionalist balancing approaches. Although the analytical 
superiority of Tucker's theory over functionalism proves questionable 
when he applies it to hypothetical "hard cases," his book provides a 
useful explication of topical free speech issues, including public access, 
fairness standards, defamation, and regulation of advertising. 
Tucker begins his analysis by juxtaposing "functionalist" and "de-
ontological" theories of free speech. Functionalists argue that free 
speech ought to be protected because it facilitates the attainment of a 
social good, such as truth-seeking4 or self-governance.5 The deonto-
logical approach, on the other hand, identifies free speech as a moral 
right which the state must respect regardless of the social cost. Tucker 
perceives weaknesses in both frameworks. He summarily dismisses 
strict deontological theories as "implausible,'' because they lack the 
requisite flexibility to accommodate important countervailing inter-
ests.6 For example, absolute protection of the news media's autonomy 
would bar government officials from using the airwaves to deliver 
messages of great national importance without the networks' consent 
(p. 60). Functionalist theories, however, fail to explain our "intuitive" 
devotion to strong individual rights, since they provide a basis for pro-
1. D.F.B. Tucker is a senior lecturer in Political Science at the University of Melbourne and 
the author of MARXISM AND INDIVIDUALISM (1980). 
2. Indeed, Tucker feels compelled to apologize for the appearance that his book "seek[s] to 
legitimate the status quo in the United States." P. 6. 
3. "Deontological" theories define rights "by reference to extremely abstract basic political 
principles such as the commitment to treat individuals with equal concern and to respect their 
dignity as persons." P. 184. By contrast, functionalist or consequentialist theories posit social 
goals and evaluate rights in terms of their tendency to maximize those goals. See also Schauer, 
The Role of the People in First Amendment Theory, 14 CALIF. L. REV. 761, 769-70 (1986). 
4. See, e.g .. J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY 13-48 (R. McCallum ed. 1946). 
5. See, e.g., A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM 27 (1960) ("The principle of the freedom 
of speech springs from the necessities of the program of self-government."). 
6. Tucker argues that strict Lockean theories "place so much emphasis on •.. liberty that 
little regulation of the media to accommodate the public interest ... can be legitimized." P. 60. 
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tecting only speech which maximizes utility. This focus on the social 
function served by speech diverts attention away from the individual's 
right to speak toward the public's right to be informed. 7 Moreover, 
functionalist balancing tests lead to "inconclusive" results, because de-
termining the relative weights of speech and nonspeech interests en-
tails extremely complex factual judgments (pp. 23, 188). Finally, the 
use of utilitarian calculus impairs judicial credibility, since the courts 
appear to be performing a legislative function (p. 179). 
As an alternative to functionalism, Tucker advocates a Rawlsian 
deontological framework. Rawls' theory identifies moral rights by im-
agining the negotiations of equal actors who possess a basic under-
standing of human nature, but lack knowledge of their positions in 
society or individual conceptions of good. 8 Since any of the negotia-
tors may belong to a social minority, they will accede to a right or 
obligation only if it distributes burdens and benefits universally.9 For 
example, since Rawlsian negotiators would not know their own reli-
gious preferences, but only that spiritual beliefs are important to many 
people, they would recognize a right to religious freedom (p. 42). 
Tucker concludes that respect for individual dignity and autonomy 
constitutes the essence of a Rawlsian ethical system. 10 Applying this 
principle to speech, Tucker deduces that although Rawlsian negotia-
tors would "favor freedom of speech and ... regard the possibility of 
censorship as highly threatening," they would not recognize an abso-
lute right to speak (p. 51). Since Rawlsian negotiators seek to maxi-
mize autonomy, they would permit restrictions to protect vulnerable 
listeners from manipulation. 11 Moreover, Tucker asserts that Rawl-
sian negotiators would view free expression as "no more than a 
residual right . . . left to us after we have done our part in ensuring 
that everyone else is treated fairly" (p. 52). In general, free speech 
prevails over other interests regardless of the social cost; but where it 
clashes with a specific "moral right," such as the right to a fair trial, 
speech loses. This shifts the inquiry in "hard cases" from the relative 
7. This focus on collective, rather than individual, rights is reflected in Meiklejohn's maxim: 
"What is essential is not that everyone shall speak, but that everything worth saying shall be 
said." MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 5, at 26. 
8. See J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 17-22 (1971). Tucker lifts Rawls' "veil of igno-
rance" slightly and endows his negotiators with general knowledge of modern industrial societies 
and a pessimistic view of human nature. Pp. 47-48. For a concise summary of Rawls' theory, see 
THE STATE, JUSTICE, AND THE COMMON Gooo 167-69, 219-40 (B. Diggs ed. 1974). 
9. Rawlsian "justice as fairness" does not require absolute equality, however, since the nego-
tiators will accept inequality if it produces a net gain at all levels of society. See J. RAWLS, supra 
note 8, at 75-83. 
10. Pp. 44-45, 50-51. Tucker "drew on the Kantian ethical ideal of personal autonomy" to 
establish "equality in concern and respect for others ... as the coordinating value." P. 185. 
11. Thus, Tucker advocates regulation of advertising (because of its nonrational "subliminal" 
impact), and establishment of a right of access where monopolization of forum results in one-
sided editorializing. Pp. 37-38, 81-82. 
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weight of the speech and nonspeech interests to the moral status of the 
nonspeech interest. 
Tucker argues that his theory offers significant advantages over 
functionalism. First, it better explains our "intuitive" devotion to in-
dividual rights even where the social cost is high. Second, unlike func-
tionalist tests, the Rawlsian approach avoids criteria based on the 
content of the speech or the status of the parties. 12 This accords with 
the ideal of equal respect for individuals, since it treats all ideas and 
persons as moral equals. Third, it avoids indeterminate balancing, 
since establishing the existence of a "moral right" ends the inquiry 
(pp. 60-61, 184-89). Tucker acknowledges that deontological theories 
suffer from rigidity, but he argues that this apparent weakness "is ac-
tually a strength" (p. 61). A degree of inflexibility comports with our 
"intuitive" reluctance to balance away free speech rights. Moreover, 
Tucker's system retains substantial flexibility. While moral rights may 
not be balanced, their exercise may be regulated. "[E]ven significant 
burdens on speakers" would not violate the free speech principle if 
"they are not so severe as to vitiate the enjoyment of the right" (p. 61). 
Furthermore, Rawlsian negotiators retain substantial latitude in defin-
ing the scope of moral rights which may override the "residual right" 
to free speech. In this manner, "Rawlsian liberalism ... allows for a 
significant amount of balancing." 13 
The need to retain flexibility, however, detracts from the analytical 
force of Tucker's framework. Since balancing re-enters when Rawl-
sian negotiators determine the "precise profile" of a right, Tucker 
must explain how his theory avoids the "indeterminacy" of functional-
ist theories. 14 Tucker claims that Rawlsian liberalism meets this bur-
den by providing "clear criteria delineating ... the protected category 
'speech'" (p. 188). But in practice his vague coordinating principle-
"equality in concern and respect for others" - appears elusive. 15 
12. Professor Schauer's argument that defamation law should show greater solicitude for 
political speech than nonpolitical speech provides a good example of a content-based functional-
ist approach. Schauer maintains that "under a strong Free Speech Principle reputations must at 
times be sacrificed to the goals of freedom of speech." F. SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILO· 
SOPHICAL ENQUIRY 173 (1982). 
13. P. 187. For example, Tucker maintains that Rawlsian negotiators would find a moral 
right to privacy where a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy, but the right's scope 
"varies depending on the circumstances." In the context of private files, we have a "right to 
expect" nondisclosure, but "we would accept many reasons as sufficient to justify an intrusion." 
Pp. 108-09. 
14. See, e.g., Tucker's criticism of Professor Schauer's balancing approach. Pp. 22-24. 
15. P. 185. Just as Tucker argues that functionalist theories too easily permit the common 
good to outweigh individual rights to free speech, Schauer asserts that theories based on respect 
for equal dignity provide "no argument against the vast number of putative restrictions on speech 
based on some specific other-regarding feature of the intended expression." F. SCHAUER, supra 
note 12, at 65. See also Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF 
LAW 153, 168 (R. Dworkin ed. 1977): 
[The principle of respect for individual autonomy] is obviously incapable of accounting for 
all of the cases that strike us as infringements of freedom of expression. On the basis of this 
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Tucker's analysis of "hard cases" reveals that his Rawlsian negotiators 
resort to the same sort of inconclusive balancing arguments function-
alists apply. The weighing of interests simply appears at an earlier 
stage of the analysis; rather than balancing already defined rights, 
Rawlsian negotiators balance interests in the course of defining the 
rights themselves. 
Tucker's discussion of the conflict between speech and privacy 
rights, comprising two full chapters, illustrates the degree of balancing 
his own theory requires. He argues that functionalist theories provide 
a poor guide where interests in privacy and speech collide. Utilitarian 
grounds would justify a rule protecting private information only if it 
"is unlikely to serve any useful social purpose" (pp. 104-05). Since the 
social value of disclosure varies with context, attempts to delineate and 
protect a category of "worthless information" result in "inconclusive 
balancing."16 To avoid this morass, Tucker proposes a "thought ex-
periment"17 to determine what privacy rights Rawlsian negotiators 
would deem fundamental. Once a right is defined, "there would be no 
question of balancing" (p. 105). 
Unfortunately, identifying the fundamental aspects of privacy re-
quires Tucker's Rawlsian negotiators to delve into utilitarian argu-
ments about the social value of protecting various classes of 
information. Tucker concludes that Rawlsian negotiators would reject 
a general right to privacy because "governments and the public ... 
often have a legitimate interest in intruding" (p. 106). A moral right 
to privacy does exist where a person has a reasonable expectation of 
privacy, but the scope of this right varies with context (pp. 108-09). 
For example, while this right applies to private papers, "many reasons 
[would be] sufficient to justify an intrusion, especially if the ... mate-
rial concerned related to matters oflegitimate public interest" (p. 109). 
Tucker also identifies a "moral right" to "that minimum freedom 
from .... intrusion which is necessary if citizens are to perform their 
democratic responsibilities adequately."18 Determining what interests 
"justify intrusion," constitute "legitimate" public concerns, or pro-
mote "democratic responsibilities" clearly calls for a complex weigh-
ing of indeterminate factors. Unless one is convinced that the 
principle alone we could raise no objection against a government that banned all parades or 
demonstrations (they interfere with traffic), outlawed posters and handbills (too messy), 
banned public meetings of more than ten people (likely to be unruly), and restricted newspa-
per publication to one page per week (to save trees). 
16. P. 105. For example, a person's health might generally be regarded as private, but where 
the individual is also an important government official, a countervailing public interest in disclo-
sure arises. 
17. The "thought experiment" is described at notes 8-11 supra and accompanying text. 
18. Pp. 110-11. Note that Tucker's deontological analysis uses a functionalist argument to 
identify this privacy right: it exists because it is "functional to the realization" of democratic 
participation. Compare this to Tucker's definitions of functionalist and deontological theories at 
p. I. 
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principle of equal dignity makes the scope of these privacy rights self-
evident, the application of Tucker's theory calls into question his claim 
that it avoids inconclusive balancing.19 
The problem. of inherent balancing undermines the benefits Tucker 
claims for his theory. For example, Tucker contends that his rights-
based theory better legitimates judicial review because "legal authority 
is not concerned with . . . competing claims of contending forces in 
society but with matters of entitlement" (p. 179). However, ascertain-
ing what entitlements exist ultimately requires the judge to determine 
how Rawlsian negotiators would resolve competing claims. 
Despite the dubious success of Tucker's quest to discover a more 
coherent guide to analysis, Law, Liberalism and Free Speech remains 
valuable for its cogent exposition of the competing interests in hard 
cases. Tucker concisely restates the leading arguments for and against 
public access to media, compensation for damage to reputation, re-
porters' rights to know, disparate treatment of print and broadcast 
media, and regulation of mixed "speech" and "action." His work is 
well researched, with useful endnotes and bibliography. The book 
should be of interest to academics and students who are seeking "a 
better understanding of why we require governments to respect free-
dom of speech" (p. 189). 
- M. Sean Laane 
19. A reliance on balancing recurs throughout Tucker's analysis. For example, he concludes 
that under his Rawlsian theory the scope of public access rights depends on a weighing of the 
editor's interest in autonomy, the burden of carrying the message, the importance of conveying 
the message, and the availability of alternate fora. Pp. 72-77. In defamation cases, Tucker ar-
gues that the balance between the burden on the press and the individual's capacity for self-help 
should define the extent of the libelant's right to respond. Pp. 97-98. 
